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H. Scott Fairley*

Fisheries Jurisdiction and
the Atlantic Salmon: Fact
and Law From A Canadian
Point of View

I. Introduction
Fisheries conservation has become an important if also recent
concern of maritime nations with significant economic sectors
heavily dependent on ocean harvests. Canada is one of these and the
Atlantic salmon is certainly conspicuous among a growing number
of endangered fisheries. Grossly depleted salmon runs in the
Maritime Provinces once supported a burgeoning estuarial and
riparine commercial fishery as well as an immensely profitable
tourist industry based on sport fishing. In the past the salmon have
suffered from domestic problems, chiefly pollution, for which
internal remedies in the form of river clean-ups, pollution abatement
and artificial inducements such as fish hatcheries have been
forthcoming. However, this article concerns a threat outside the
ability of purely domestic policies to control: the exploitation of
Canadian salmon stocks beyond their streams of origin by other
fishing nations not responsible for the maintenance of the fishery.
The Atlantic salmon fishery occupies a less important economic
position for Canada than its much larger Pacific counterpart. The
British Columbia fishery has been privileged with the protection of
international agreements and comparative freedom from pollution.
Nevertheless, long term security for the fishery is lacking. Hence
the present study should be of relevance for Canadian salmon
fisheries as a whole and not simply its improverished eastern sector.
II. Backgroundto the Problem:Crisis and Conflict
Salmon are an anadromous species which means simply that they
*H. Scott Fairley B.A., 1974, LL.B., 1977 (Queen's); student-at-law, Toronto,
Ontario
A preliminary version of this paper was prepared for a seminar on the Law of the
Sea led by Prof. G. W. Alexandrowicz in the Faculty of Law, Queen's University
whom the writer thanks for his assistance and encouragement on the project at that
time and in revising it for publication. Further thanks are due to Dr. C. J. Kerswill
and Mr. J. Pratt both of the Fisheries and Marine Service and Mr. B. Applebaum of
the International Directorate, Ministry of the Environment, Ottawa for helpful
information and comment.
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spawn in inland waters, usually in the upper reaches of their streams
of origin where the newly hatched fingerlings partially mature, and
migrate out to sea where they spend most of their adult lives.
Salmon return by instinct to the same stream bed where they were
born.1 If they cannot do this they will not reproduce. Each salmon
run contributes its quota to the preservation of the species and the
responsibility for their maintenance as well as the harvesting
benefits fall to the state where the runs are located.
In the summer of 1958, United States nuclear submarines2
conducted submerged polar voyages through the Canadian Arctic.
Large schools of salmon were detected feeding on the fringes of the
pack ice off West Greenland in the Davis Strait. While the seasonal
presence of salmon had been noted as early as 1939 their
commercial significance was not initially recognized; the first
recorded exploitation of this resource did not occur until 1960 when
inshore fishermen from Greenland netted approximately 60 metric
tons in their first season. 3 The inshore fishery rapidly escalated
when the potential for the salmon fishery became apparent, reaching
a peak of 1539 tons in 1964. This effort was reinforced by an
offshore fishery entered into by Denmark in 1965, roughly
paralleling inshore yields by the end of the decade. Both inshore and
offshore fisheries ranged all along the west coast of Greenland with
the major effort being concentrated in a 30 to 40 mile belt of ocean
4
next to the coast.
The discovery of where the Atlantic salmon concentrated during
the ocean-going portion of its life cycle immediately raised the
question of the distribution of these fish in terms of their points of
origin and the consequences of exploitation on the high seas for
traditional fisheries geared to the return of the Atlantic salmon at
1. See J. W. Jones, The Salmon (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959); for
comparative purposes a useful study of Pacific salmon can be found in D. Hasler,
Underwater Guideposts: Homing of Salmon (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1966).
2. R. G. Hewlett and F. Duncan, Nuclear Navy (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1974) at 371
3. A. W. May, "Distribution and Migrations of Salmon in the Northwest
Atlantic," in Proceedingsof the InternationalSymposium on the Atlantic Salmon:
ManagementBiology and Survival of the Species, M. W. Smith and W. M. Carter
eds., held at St. Andrews, New Brunswick, September 20-22, 1972 (Fredericton:
Unipress Ltd., 1973) at 373
4. Id. at 373-374; Dr. May cites a peak of 1240 tons for the offshore fishery
achieved in 1971. The fishing grounds range from 60 degrees north to 70 degrees
north latitude and are exploited seasonally from August to November of each year.
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spawning time. Preliminary tagging experiments conducted under
the auspices of the International Commission for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) revealed that Atlantic salmon found off
West Greenland originated from both sides of the Atlantic, but data
was unsufficient to prove conclusively the proportional content of
the schools that were being fished. 5 The need for more
comprehensive information and statistics in order to evaluate the
impact of the West Greenland salmon fishery was recognized by
Canada as well as concerned European members of ICNAF and, in
1965, a Joint Working Party sponsored by ICNAF and the
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) was
6
established to look further into the situation.
The Greenland fishery as a whole was still an infant in the
mid-1960's. And at this point in time, the new competitor appeared
to be causing no discernable ill-effects on the Canadian fishery. In
fact, the total Canadian catch of salmon on the Atlantic coast did not
peak until 1967. 7 However, the commencement of offshore fishing
by Denmark in 1965 - augmented by smaller efforts coming from
Norway and the Faroes - did become worrisome. Canadian
concern grew in direct proportion to the increasing intensity of the
8
Danish fishing effort.
At the eighteenth annual meeting of ICNAF convened at London
in June of 1968, Canada proposed that all fishing for salmon beyond
national fishery zones be prohibited in the Convention area
governed by the Commission. 9 The following year at Warsaw the
5. ICNAF, 14 Annual Proceedings 1963-1964 at 31(1964); the report cited 26
recaptures: Maine (USA) 1; New Brunswick and Newfoundland 10; England 8;
Scotland 5; Sweden 2. However the report concluded only "that salmon from both
sides of the Atlantic move to West Greenland on feeding migrations where they
occur along the coast in inshore as well as in offshore waters."
6. B. B. Parrish, "A Review of the Work of the ICES/ICNAF Joint Working Party
on North Atlantic Salmon," in Proceedingsof the InternationalSymposium on the
Atlantic Salmon: Management Biology and Survival of the Species, M. W. Smith
and W. M. Carter eds., held at St. Andrews, New Brunswick, September 20-22,
1972 (Fredericton: Unipress Ltd., 1973) at 383
7. See Appendix 1, Table I
8. Dr. Parrish has divided the West Greenland salmon fishery spanning the period
1900 to 1971 into three phases: "the Period of rapid growth of the set gill-net
fishery in the years 1960 to 1964 when the catches increased from 60 to 1,500
metric tons; the period 1965 to 1968 when total catches fluctuated without any
significant trend about a mean of around 1,200 metric tons; the period 1969 to 1971
of substantially higher catches, in excess of 2,000 metric tons, following the major
growth of the drift-net fishery." Supra, note 6 at 385
9. ICNAF, 18 Annual Proceedings 1967-1968 at 30 (1968)
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ICES/ICNAF Joint Working Party on Atlantic salmon reported that
while data was still insufficient to "estimate accurately" the
distribution of losses to home fisheries occasioned by the West
Greenland fishery, "the largest proportion of total losses have
continued to be experienced by the fisheries for salmon in Canada
and the United Kingdom." 10 The Commission in plenary session 11
took further note of the Canadian submission at the previous
meeting in London and it was agreed that "the Commission
recommend to the Contracting Governments that the fishing for
salmon in the waters outside national fishery limits should be
prohibited in the Convention Area."112 However, since the
Commission's recommendations had no binding effect the resolution furnished no real protection to the Canadian fishery.
By 1969 the Canadian Atlantic coast salmon fishery was
definitely in trouble. The overall catch had dropped almost two
million pounds (fresh weight) since 1967.13 To be sure, the decline
could not be attributed solely to the West Greenland fishery; many
of Canada's eastern salmon rivers were suffering the cumulative
effects of pollution and poor management. 14 Nevertheless, just as
these problems were being addressed the spectre of exploitation on
the high seas threatened to render all efforts at recovery superfluous.
The 1970 report of the Fisheries Research Board biological station
at St. Andrews, New Brunswick furnished additional evidence
substantiating this dismal forecast:
Atlantic salmon commercial catches in 1970 for the Gulf of St.
Lawrence coast of mainland Canada (Cape Gaspe to northern tip
of Cape Breton) were the lowest recorded in 100 years. This
continues a decreasing trend started about 1965, from 1.4 million
lb. to a low of 0.7 million lb. in 1970. It contrasts with an upward
trend of much larger landings in the Davis Strait-West Greenland
area, which impinged on the same year classes (3.4 million lb. in
1964 and 4.7 million lb. in 1969). This distant-water fishery in
1970 gives early promise of approximating the 1969 landings; if
an inverse relation with the Gulf of St. Lawrence fishery exists,
the latter is unlikely to increase greatly in 1971.15
10. ICNAF, 19Annual Proceedings1968-1969 at 23 (1969)
11. The fifteen member nations constituting ICNAF are: Canada, Denmark,
France, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Soviet Union,
Spain, United Kingdom, United States, West Germany.
12. Supra, note 10 at 28.
13. See Appendix I,Table 1
14. R. Haig-Brown, The Salmon (Ottawa: Environment Canada, Fisheries and
Marine Service, 1974) at 16-19
15. Fisheries Research Board of Canada, Review 1969-1970, (Ottawa, 1971) at 76
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Such statistical correlations clearly indicated the policy Canada was
required to pursue: the banning of fishing for salmon on the high
seas.
By 1970 the work of the ICES/ICNAF Joint Working Party had
progressed to the point where the effects of the West Greenland
fishery on salmon catches in home waters and the conservation of
Atlantic salmon stocks as a whole could be better understood. The
results of tagging salmon in home waters and getting returns from
the West Greenland fishery indicated that Canadian and British
rivers furnished the bulk of salmon stocks being exploited there.
Parasite studies of random samples further suggested that a majority
of the salmon were of North American origin. 16 Later studies
evidenced that a catch in the West Greenland fishery of 2000 metric
tons would result in a total loss to all home waters fisheries of
17
between 500 and 1900 metric tons.
The research of the Joint Working Party pointed to the possibility
that by some quirk of nature in the distribution of Atlantic salmon in
their feeding groups off West Greenland, certain salmon runs of
Canadian origin were particularly vulnerable to high seas
exploitation.' 8 The precipitous decline of the New Brunswick
salmon fishery in recent years,1 9 while factors such as pollution and
river bed obstructions have also played a role, would appear to
reinforce this hypothesis. If such a phenomenon is indeed the case
with respect to certain sectors of the Canadian Atlantic salmon
fishery, it can only strengthen the original Canadian position
advocating a ban on high seas exploitation of this species.
Canadian efforts to counter the rapidly worsening situation for
Maritime salmon stocks had been initially channeled through
ICNAF since the West Greenland fishery fell squarely within the
convention area. However, things were moving far too slowly for
those Canadians who suffered directly as a result of fewer salmon
coming back to their streams of origin, the fishermen themselves.
Early in 1970 Lloyd Crouse, the Opposition critic for fisheries
urged upon Jack Davis, Minister of Fisheries and Forestry, that
16. ICNAF, 20 Annual Proceedings1969-1970 at p. 25 (1970)
17. ICNAF, 21 Annual Proceedings1970-1971 at p. 25 (1971)
18. Studies have indicated that the salmon stocks of the Miramichi River in New
Brunswick are very sensitive to high seas exploitation "thereby indicating a lower
total catch from that group of salmon in the presence of the West Greenland fishery
than in its absence." Parrish, supra, note 6 at 393; see also A. W. May, supra,
note3 at381
19. See Appendix I, Table II
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some international agreement be reached placing a reasonable quota
on the taking of salmon off Greenland. Mr. Davis replied that the
question had indeed been taken up at the international level "and all
but two countries have agreed on abstention ...."20 Unfortunately, few concessions were forthcoming from the countries that
really mattered. The chief beneficiary of the Greenland fishery
remained intransigent in exercising its high seas freedoms. 21
Discussions before the Standing Committee on Fisheries and
Forestry pointed to the frustration experienced by Canadians in
removing domestic threats to the salmon only to have them scooped
up before they can return home. Mr. Crouse observed with accuracy
the potential futility of the whole exercise: "Why would you
recommend we spend $250 million, for example, in re-establishing
runs, while at the same time we obviously have not control of the
offshore fishing which takes this resource." Homer Stevens,
President of the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union and
witness before the Committee, admitted the conflict cited by Crouse
but emphasized that, to preserve the fishery at all, such expenditures
were required to build up the depleted runs and that these efforts
should be based on the assumption that an international solution
could be found. 22 Mr. Stevens perceived correctly that "the
extension of exclusive fishing zones and so on will not solve the
problem ...."123
In a later session of the same Standing Committee, Mr. Crouse
pinpointed the crux of the Canadian position. He borrowed a
metaphor from a similarly aggrieved British member of Parliament:
24
"Denmark is milking a cow which she neither owns nor feeds."
Having decided that the "cow" should continue to be nourished at
Canadian expense the assumption was clear that proprietal rights
should devolve from such a substantial investment. The Minister of
Fisheries noted that the West Greenland salmon fishery took place
20. Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. IV, pp. 3758-3759, February 18,
1970 (hereinafter cited as Commons Debates)
21. Denmark, supported by West Germany, had blocked the Canadian proposal
banning the exploitation of salmon on the high seas. See ICNAF, 18 Annual
Proceedings, supra, note 9. The West Greenland fishery falls within Subarea 1
covered by the convention.
22. Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on Fisheries and Forestry,
Proceedings, No. 12, (March 19, 1970) at 44 (hereinafter cited as Standing
Committee on Fisheries)
23. Id. at 49
24. Standing Committee on Fisheries,No. 17, (April 23, 1970) at 9
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not only on the high seas but within their exclusive fishing zones as
well. "So, we are in effect, saying if we wish to protect our salmon
fisheries, do not catch salmon not only on the high seas, but also our
salmon which happen to swim within your fisheries waters
....
5 Canada required a vested legal right to preferential control
and exploitation of her salmon stocks no matter where the fish
happened to go; the problem was one of establishing jurisdiction
over the fish themselves, -not simply a geographically delimited
zone in which the fish might be found at a particular time.
Canada entertained high hopes for a favourable settlement of their
salmon claim going into the 1970 ICNAF conference held at St.
John's, Newfoundland. However, the opposition remained steadfast. Between 1968 and 1969 the West Greenland fishery had
increased its catch by almost ninety per cent due to a doubling of the
number of drift-net vessels in the fishery and the use of highly
efficient monofilament nylon nets. 26 While Canada's proposal for
banning the fishery altogether was still blocked by Denmark, the
latter offered to limit its fishing effort to the 1969 level in terms of
equipment used and agreed to the prohibition of monofilament
nylon nets except those purchased before 1 July 1970. There was
another provision whereby those nations not participating in the
fishery would agree not to take salmon beyond their national fishing
zones. The agreement was to last for one year.2 7 Canada voted
against the resolution in disgust. The Danish compromise was no
concession at all since the West Greenland fishery had peaked in
1969 and the Danish and Greenland fleets were fully equipped with
28
the more effective nets prior to the prohibition coming into force.
The Opposition critics in Ottawa had earlier advocated economic
sanctions against Denmark, a suggestion to which Fisheries
Minister Davis gave no decisive response. 2 9 Despite the
Government's failure to bring Denmark around, however, its
position exhibited remarkable consistency. The Opposition queried
whether it was fair to restrict Canadian salmon fishermen as to
where they could take fish if the salmon were to be lost to Denmark
in any case. Davis replied unequivocally: "our policy is no fishing
25. Id. at 10
26. ICNAF, 20Annual Proceedings1969-1970 at 25 (1970)
27. Id. at 20, 39; the resolution passed by 10 votes to 4 (one member abstaining);
salmon catches had doubled to 2,180 metric tons in 1969.
28. B. B. Parrish, supra, note 6 at 386
29. Commons Debates, Vol. VII, at 7429-7430, May 28, 1970
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for salmon on the high seas. I do not think it would be appropriate
for us to relax our regulations with respect to Canadian fishermen
on the high seas." 30
When ICNAF convened again at Halifax in 1971 a Canadian
chaired the meeting. Dr. Needler stated forcefully that "we shall
continue to press for a ban on the fishing for Atlantic salmon on the
high seas." He emphasized that a reasonable return from the fishery
was an essential incentive to its preservation. 3 ' The ICES/ICNAF
Joint Working Party reported that the West Greenland Fishery
yielded a catch substantially equal to the record take of 1969.32 A
Canadian proposal to limit the West Greenland fishery to eighty per
cent of its 1969 catch and vessel tonnage was defeated while the
Danish proposal to renew the 1970 agreement effective until 1973
was accepted. 33 Back in Ottawa the Opposition critics were quick to
emphasize that the absence of a catch limitation in favour of a
ceiling on the number of vessels to be employed made such an
agreement of negligible value. 3 4 And just prior to the Halifax
gathering one Opposition member had questioned the utility of
continuing fruitless negotiations in such a forum. Mr. McGrath
commented: "We have been notably unsuccessful in our efforts to
prevail upon the Danes to substantially reduce their catch with a
view to avoiding total extinction of the species . . . . I think
therefore, we must, as a consequence of our failure to obtain
meaningful agreement with the Danes, look at our position within
ICNAF .... ,,35
Canada's growing disenchantment with ICNAF was apparent
when events were taken to hand from an unexpected quarter. The
United States Congress, largely in response to a power lobby of
New England sportsmen and anglers who sought to preserve the
30. Commons Debates, Vol. VII, at 7598, June 2, 1970
31. ICNAF, 21AnnualProceedings1970-1971 at 19 (1971)
32. Id. at 25
33. Id. at 30-31; the Canadian recommendation failed 3 votes for, to 5 votes
against with 7 abstentions.
34. 2 Int'l Canada at 154 (1971); Commons Debates, Vol. VI, at 6414, June 7,
1971
35. "We must be a joke in the international forum," Mr. McGrath continued,
"especially in ICNAF, because I submit there is not one member of ... ICNAF
who has a greater stake in the North Atlantic fisheries than does this country. Yet
this country has gone in with half-hearted efforts . . ." He urged a "talk tough"
policy and possible economic sanctions. "That is the only kind of language the
Danes will understand, and in my view that is the only way in which we can protect
this important resource from virtual extinction." Commons Debates Vol. V, at
5004-5, April 7, 1971
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vestiges of their own virtually extinct salmon runs, had placed a
boycott on all Danish fish products coming into the United States.
Denmark gave in to American pressure and the result was a joint
proposal from the two countries presented to ICNAF for the phasing
out of the Danish high seas salmon fishery, excluding the Greenland
inshore fishery. Why had Denmark acquiesced so easily after giving
nothing to Canada for so long? The reason was quite simple and
correctly stated by Minister Davis before the Standing Committee
on Fisheries.36 Denmark, along with other Scandinavian countries
as well as the United Kingdom, was about to enter the European
Economic Community (EEC). Greenland, while de facto Danish
territory, enjoyed associate status with the mother country and
would not be included in the membership of the Community. One of
the terms of Community membership was reciprocal access to zones
of national fisheries jurisdiction. As a result, Denmark, having a
common fishing zone with other EEC members would be excluded
from fishing within the territorial sea around Greenland. Giving up
the salmon fishery in the narrow zone beyond that area 3 7 was not
worth fussing over, or antagonizing a country like the United States.
In any case the same benefits could accrue indirectly through the
Greenland fishery.
The joint proposal was in effect a bilateral agreement between the
two countries soon to become a treaty. 38 The agreement prescribed
a gradual phasing out of the Danish component of the West
Greenland fishery "in the calendar years of 1972, 1973, 1974 and
1975 to an approximate level of 800, 600, 550 and 500 tons
respectively." The annual catch by local Greenland fishermen was
to be the average of the catches spanning 1964 through 1971,
approximately 1100 metric tons. The Danish component was to
cease fishing altogether by 1976. 3 9 The proposal received approval
at the 1972 gathering of ICNAF at Washington by a comfortable
majority. 40 Canada's one attempt to amend the proposal so as to
have the Danish component of the fishery closed down by 1973 and
the Greenland catch inside the three mile limit maintained at or
36. Standing Committee on Fisheries,No. 1 (March 13, 1972) at 24
37. It will be recalled, supra, note 4 that the salmon concentrate off West
Greenland no more than thirty to forty miles from the coast.
38. 23U.S.T., 1278 (1972)
39. Id.
40. ICNAF, 22 Annual Proceedings 1971-1972 at 3031; 12 votes to I (Canada)
with 2 abstentions
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below previous catches was defeated. 4 1 In contrast, a House of
Commons resolution on Atlantic salmon 42 submitted by the
Canadian delegation to the Washington meeting barely received lip
service in light of thefait-accompliof the prevailing accord.
In Parliament, the Opposition displayed increasing dissatisfaction
43
over the Government's inability to come to terms with Denmark.
With respect to the Danish-American agreement the reaction of Mr.
McGrath (Fisheries critic, St. John's East) typified Maritime
political sentiments: "They are laughing at us now."
The Globe and Mail today carries a story from the Danish
Embassy. .. and Mr. Abrahamsen, who is one of the officials in
the Danish Embassy, indicated that the 800 tons of canned
salmon they catch in 4 months every year is of "negligible
significance to the national economy. That is why" - and the
paper is quoting him - "we gave in to the U.S. pressure."
44
Surely that to me is a terrible slap in the face of Canada.
He Went on to cite the American boycott and the failure of the
Canadian Government to be similarly tough-minded. Dr. Needler,
an expert witness before the Committee, had to admit that the
agreement still allowed for the taking of enough salmon to severely
jeopardize the recovery of the fishery. 4 5 The sad irony about the
whole affair was that in order to satisfy their own conservationist
sentiments, the Americans in effect traded away the welfare of a
fishery that did not even belong to them.
This agreement became a particularly sore point for Canada in
view of the Canadian Government's decision to close down the
almost exhausted salmon runs on the St. John, Mirimachi and
41. 4 votes for (Canada, France, Iceland and the Soviet Union) with 4 votes
against (Denmark, Germany, Italy and Norway) and 7 abstentions
42. Whereas the Atlantic salmon is the most threatened fish in the North Atlantic,
And whereas only by a concerted international effort can an agreement be
reached to protect salmon from being overfished,
And whereas it is the position of the government of Canada that Canada has the
exclusive right to harvest salmon that spawn in Canadian rivers,
This Canadian House of Commons calls on all nations participating in the
International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Meeting in Washington, D.C. in May, 1972 to agree that the survival of the Atlantic salmon as a
species is of paramount concern and to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure
such survival. Commons Debates, Vol. II, at 1603, April 25, 1972
43. Mr. Heath Macquarrie: "Are we recalling our ambassador from Copenhagen
for consultation? In short, when are we ending our mealy-mouthed diplomacy on
this matter?" Commons Debates Vol. 11, at 1864, May 3, 1972
44. Standing Committee on Fisheries, No. 7, (May 4, 1972), at 17

45. Id. at 18
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Restigouche rivers in New Brunswick and in the Port Aux Basques
area of Newfoundland. 4 6 It was estimated that a full cycle of six
years would be required to elapse before commercial operations
could resume. The volume of the mainland take of salmon had
dropped almost eighty per cent since 1967 and no alternative
remained to preserve what was left of the runs. The Minister
subsequently spoke to salmon fishermen at a meeting in Chatham,
New Brunswick 4 7 to explain the reasons for taking away their
livelihood. He emphasized the problem posed by the distant water
fishing of salmon, and he cited a $30 million campaign to improve
and restore the salmon rivers and a continuing budget starting with
$2 million to compensate and diversify the activities of the
48
fishermen affected while the salmon recovered.
From the fishermen's point of view, the situation was far from
satisfactory. In theory the federal government's system of
compensation payments was very generous allowing the fishermen
to choose the best three consecutive year catches on which to base
the level of payment. However the administration of the programme
was allegedly mishandled since some bureaucrats felt the formula
was too generous and used arbitrary figures expecially where a
fisherman's records were incomplete. Moreover, there was no
appeal procedure4 9 although on further prodding the Minister of
Fisheries agreed to an investigation of grievances which helped to
clear the air. 50 But as one Member of Parliament perceptively
observed: "even full compensation in terms of dollars cannot
recompense these people for the loss of a way of life." ' 51 In this
respect, the loss of the salmon may entail a far greater loss social, cultural as well as economic - in terms of the dependencies
at stake.
Ill. The PositionDelineated:FactualPersuasiveness
Canada does not want Denmark, or any country for that matter,
46. Environment Canada, Statement on Closures in the Atlantic Salmon Fisher,
Jack Davis, Minister of Fisheries, House of Commons, April 24, 1972
47. Fisheries Canada, Saving Our Atlantic Salmon, notes for address by the Hon.
Jack Davis to commercial salmon fishermen, Chatham N.B., April 27, 1972. Some
900 fishermen were affected by the closures.
48. Id. at 3-9
49. See address of G.A.P. Smith, Commons Debates, Vol. I, Jan. 9, 1973 at
95-97
50. Commons Debates Vol. I, at 133-4, January 9, 1973; Vol. V, at 5487-8, July
10, 1973
51. G.A.P. Smith, supra note 49 at 97
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fishing for her salmon on the high seas. More precisely, the
Canadian claim goes to the prohibition of any exploitation of
anadromous species beyond the control of the state of origin of the
given species. To be sure the Canadian position is one of
self-interest; but the presence of self-interest cannot be said to be
determinative of the presence or absence of fairness and
reasonableness.
In the spring of 1970 the Department of External Affairs issued
the following statement:
In our view, high seas fishing for salmon, by its very nature, does
not discriminate as to the river of origin of the fish, and
increasing high seas fishing will make salmon management
impossible . .

.

.Salmon are a species separate from the general

high seas fishery and no other fishery is so dependent upon the
positive efforts of particular states in their home rivers to assure
its continuance. We pointed out that the maintenance and growth
of Canadian salmon runs depend on research and development
and also abstaining from using the rivers for other purposes
which, taken together, are costly to Canada's economy. Canada
has consistently opposed high seas fishing for salmon and has
ensured that its own fishing fleets in the Pacific Ocean adhere to
strict regulations by fishing within national fishery limits in order
to carry out good conservation methods. The Canadian
Government therefore expressed the hope
that the Danish
52
Government would reconsider their position.
Is the Canadian request so extraordinary or inequitable? To answer
this question one must consider the assumptions and criteria framing
the claim to preferential rights and the basis for applying a principle
of abstention.
The Canadian approach to the management of salmon is
essentially an articulation of the "functional approach" which has
characterized the Canadian style of international negotiations:
designing a specific solution based upon the nature and circumstances of a given problem. Problems of conservation and
management of marine resources are particularly amenable to this
mode of solution. It has been recognized by one learned observer
that "there is no life that can be drawn on the ocean that separates
living marine resources into convenient spatial categories, either as
52. 1 Int'l Canada 124, 125 (1970); statement issued in conjunction with an
aide-memorie submitted to Denmark calling for a total ban of salmon fishing on the
high seas, May 13, 1970
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to species or as to groups of species." 53 Fish are governed by their
nature and instinct; carefully delineated juridical categories such as
the high seas, territorial sea and fishing zones, while convenient for
men, are held in utter contempt by marine populations to which they
may apply. Handling fisheries problems by species rather than by
ecological or geographical units concedes this fact. Nature sets the
54
rules; solutions which ignore these rules are doomed to failure.
Canada outlined this functional approach in the submission of its
delegation to Sub-Committee II of the Seabed Committee preparing
55
for the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
The working paper stressed that species had to be differentiated as
between sedentary, coastal, anadromous and wide-ranging types in
order to be managed properly. With respect to anadromous species,
the Delegation pointed out that, "the state of origin has virtually
sole responsibility for the continued existence of the stocks and
must make major expenditures to assure continuation of the runs."
These heavy and unique responsibilities and the high cost of
exercising them .

.

. can be justified only if management

authority is vested in the state of origin and if that state, in
principle has the sole right to harvest the anadromous species
bred in its own rivers. As a step in this direction the Canadian
for these species should
authorities have proposed that fisheries
56
not be conducted on the high seas.
The Delegation emphasized that, in general, the responsibility and
attendant costs of fisheries management must be balanced by a
management authority adequate to the task and a preferential right
to utilization subject to internationally agreed principles .57
The principle requiring recognition is that of abstention. The
practical arguments in favour of it are extensive. The direct costs of
maintaining the salmon runs are themselves oppressive, but the
53. W. M. Chapman, "Fishery Resources in Offshore Waters" in Lewis M.
Alexander, ed., The Law of the Sea (Ohio State University Press, 1967) at 88
54. See P. A. Larkin, "Fisheries Management Provisions in the Commission
Report," in Lewis M. Alexander, ed., The Law of the Sea: National Policy
Recommendations, Proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute, 4th Annual
Conference, (Kingston: University of Rhode Island Press, 1970). Dr. Larkin
presents a critique of the Marine Science Commission recommendations which did
not adopt the "species approach" to problems of fisheries management. See A
Planfor NationalAction (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969)
55. Managementof the Living Reso'urces of the Sea: Working PaperSubmitted by
the Delegation of Canada, G.A.O.R., 27th Sess., Supp. No. 21, U.N. Doe.
A/8721 at 164 (1972)
56. Id. at 156
57. Id. at 167
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opportunity costs involved in terms of alternative uses are even
greater. 58 Then, it is also true that the high seas fishing of salmon is
economically inefficient. 59 It has been shown that, on average,
Atlantic salmon increase their weight by approximately fifty per
cent on their homeward journey to spawn,6 0 far outstripping natural
mortality during the same period. Furthermore, the fishing for
salmon away from their streams of origin makes it impossible to
manage individual runs since they all come together in the open sea.
Thus, there is no way of assuring that enough fish get back to
rejuvenate each run. The Miramichi River in New Brunswick
provides the classic example of a random victim of the high seas
6
fishery. 1
The common sense of the Canadian position, however, would
make little difference to Denmark and Greenland since the
alternative to economic inefficiency, for them, is no salmon at all.
Denmark has argued repeatedly that the state of origin is not entitled
to exclusive exploitation and management of anadromous species.
During migration the salmon spends much of its life on the high seas
and off the coasts of other countries, "depending fully on the sea
resources of those areas" and competing for those resources with
local fishermen. 62 These arguments have been countered convinc58. Haig-Brown, supra, note 14 at 20, and, supra, notes 52, 47 and 46; also see
the statement of Mr. Legault (Canada) before the Second Committee on the
Economic Zone, 31st mtg., 9 August, 1974, Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea O.R. Vol. II, at 231 (1974). Mr. Legault emphasized both the
direct and opportunity costs involved and that "Therefore provisions should be
made to take into account the special interests of states of origin, like Canada, in
the total management of anadromous species .... "
59. A contemporary study of the Pacific salmon fishery provides a convenient
basis for comparison. Crutchfield and Pontecorvo, consider harvesting of Pacific
salmon on the high seas "woefully inefficient" on three grounds: "First, there is
obviously a waste of capital and labor involved in the high-seas operation itself,
since it cannot be as efficient as a fishery harvesting the fish as they approach the
spawning streams near operating bases and in concentrated groups. Secondly, all
Pacific salmon grow rapidly during the last week before the spawning runs begin; a
high-seas fishery sacrifices a considerable amount of weight for relatively little
offset in the way of reduced natural mortality. Finally, it makes it impossible to
manage individual runs." The Pacific Sahnon Fisheries:A Study in Irrational
Conservation(Baltimore: Johns-Hopkins Press, 1969) at 192
60. Parrish, supra, note 6 at 392; Third United Nations Conference of the Law of
the Sea, O.R. Vol. II, at 231 (1974), supra, note 58
61. Supra, note 18
62. Statement of Mr. Fergo (Denmark) before Second Committee on the
Economic Zone, 28th mtg. 6 August 1974, Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, O.R. Vol. II, at 220 (1974)
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ingly by the Fisheries Council of Canada before the Standing
Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. 63 In answer
to the one argument, it was stated "the nations of the world do not
contribute to the existence of salmon or of their high seas habitat.
The salmon are merely grazing on the open range of the ocean and
in a very real sense have been 'put to sea' for this purpose by the
country by origin." Similarly, the fact that salmon may occupy the
territorial sea or fishing zone of another state does not alter the basis
for the Canadian claim:
... here again, such countries are not contributing to the
existence of those salmon. The salmon are merely taking up
transient space in that country's waters and may be feeding on
natural organisms which are present. The passage of those
salmon could be likened to the innocent passage of ships through
such waters. Any interceptions
there should be by agreement
64
with the country of origin.
The Danish position has nothing to recommend it save the
proposition that there is no rule of international law or treaty
obligation prohibiting them from doing what they continue to do.
And even this assertion, it will be shown, is questionable.
The assumptions underlying the Canadian position are valid;
under any criteria of responsibility, practicality, economic efficiency or reasonableness Canada is not asking for anything more
than it deserves as a matter of principle. However, the rights being
claimed as a matter of principle are of no consequence unless
recognized by nations upon whose conduct the efficacy of the
exercise of the right depends. Moreover, effectiveness depends
upon the creation of substantive legal obligations and not simply
agreements for a given period of time on the basis of comity.
IV. Alternative Approaches

Choosing the appropriate vehicle for achieving a given objective
assumes an importance equal to the objective itself. Canada has
been working toward recognition of her fundamental interest in the
control and management of her Atlantic salmon for the better part of
a decade and has yet to be rewarded with any concrete achievement.
The reasons for failure might be attributed as much to the mode of
63. Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and
National Defence, Proceedings, No. 1, (March 12, 1974) at 34-35 (hereinafter
cited as Standing Committee on Ext. Aff.).
64. Id.
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approach as to the potential for acceptance of the objective by those
members of the international community from whom acceptance is
required. Indeed, it is submitted, the chosen method may be
decisive in furthering or foreclosing receipt of the acceptance
sought. In this respect, several avenues are deserving of assessment:
resolution by a specialized international organization - ICNAF;
bilateral negotiation of the controversy; and the creation of a
binding international legal norm through international consensus.
This latter process is exemplified by the current deliberations in the
Third Law of the Sea Conference.
Canada first elected ICNAF as the appropriate venue for bringing
her grievances against Denmark specifically and making her salmon
claim at the international level. The failure of this appeal has
already been discussed at some length. The Convention establishing
the Commission 65 gave it no regulatory powers as such and its
recommendations are only effective upon those members who
contract to be bound. Recently instituted procedures for a scheme of
inspection of members' fishing vessels at sea by other contracting
governments 66 do nothing to materially alter the Commission's
authority. "As an experiment in international fishery management,"
one scholar in the international law of fisheries has remarked,
"this Convention is

. .

. a timid venture and the shared authorities

of the contracting parties to exploit and conserve the resources in the
convention waters are scarcely affected." 67
It would seem that ICNAF is incapable of itself to offer a solution
to the Canadian dilemma. The very nature of the Commission
protects Danish intransigence. Moreover, the continuance of
Canada's membership in ICNAF is now subject to question. On
June 4, 1976 the Minister of External Affairs, Allan MacEachen,
announced the Government's intent to extend exclusive fisheries
jurisdiction 200 miles beyond baselines demarcating Canada's
coast. 6 8 This decision was presaged by a number of phasing out
agreements 69 with countries currently fishing in the new zone of
65. Signed at Washington 8 February 1949, 157 U.N.T.S. 157 (1953)
66. ICNAF, 20 Proceedings 1969-1970, at 20-22 (1970); for a brief overview of
Canada and ICNAF see J.A. Yogis, "Canadian Fisheries and International Law"
in R.St.J. Macdonald et al., ed., CanadianPerspectiveson InternationalLaw and
Organization(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) at 398 esp. at 400-402
67. D. Johnston, The InternationalLaw of Fisheries(New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1965) at 369
68. Canada, External Affairs, Statement, House of Commons, June 4, 1976
69. Agreement Between Canadaand Norway, signed: Ottawa, December 2, 1975,
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jurisdiction which would take account of "88 per cent of the foreign
catch in that part of the ICNAF Convention area to be incorporated
within Canada's 200 mile zone." 70 This intention was confirmed by
an Order-In-Council announced on November 2, 1976 rendering the
extension of fisheries limits effective as of January 1, 1977. 7 1 This
unilateral action by Canada, together with the bilateral agreements
supporting it may have rendered ICNAF superfluous to Canadian
interests given that the new zone of fisheries jurisdiction serves as a
guarantor of coastal fisheries interests; also the Commission has
been unable to deal affirmatively with major problems, not the least
being the salmon issue which continues unsolved.
Canada had indicated her possible departure from ICNAF at the
annual meeting of the organization in June of 1976.72 However, just
prior to Canada's placing into force of the 200 mile limit at the
commencement of the new year, the Commission voted in favour of
amending the Convention so as to restrict its management authority
to the portions of the Convention area remaining outside national
fisheries limits. 73 Consequently Canada has not felt compelled to
leave the Convention even though the continued utility of ICNAF
might be considered negligible.
The shortcomings of ICNAF are all too apparent. As one
interested party once put it: "Commissions are slow, and with the
in force: May 11, 1976, ratified: Oslo, May 11, 1976; see Canada, External
Affairs, Communique No. 46, May 12, 1976.
Agreement Between Canada and Poland, signed: Ottawa, May 14, 1976, in force:
May 14, 1976; see Canada External Affairs, Communique, No. 48, May 14, 1976.
Agreement Between Canada and the Soviet Union, signed: Moscow May 19, 1976,
in force: May 19, 1976; see Canada, External Affairs, Communique No. 53, June
1, 1976.
Agreement Between Canada and Spain, signed: Madrid, June 10, 1976, in force:
June 10, 1976; see Canada, External Affairs, Communique, No. 57, June 10, 1976.
70. Canada, External Affairs, Statement, House of Commons, June 4, 1976
71. Canada, External Affairs, Communique, No. 116, November 2, 1976; for text
of the Order-In-Council see CanadaGazette (special ed.) November 1, 1976
72. Environment Canada-Fisheries, Statement by the Minister of State for
Fisheries, Romeo Leblanc at the opening of the 1976 annual meeting of ICNAF,
Montreal, 8 June 1976: "In view of the impending jurisdictional changes and the
present ICNAF procedure which allows member nations to lodge objections to
measures agreed at the present meeting, Canada must serve notice, by June 20,
1976, of its intention to withdraw from ICNAF on December 31, 1976. Canada
will not necessarily proceed with withdrawal but must preserve this option to clear
the way for new multilateral arrangements which take into account the new
jurisdictional realities."
73. See Canada, External Affairs, Statement, by the Secretary of State for External
Affairs, Don Jamieson, at the opening of the International Conference on the
Future of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, March 14, 1977
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best of intentions, by the time you get several governments to agree
to do something you may well have lost the fishery that you are
trying to protect." ' 7 4 Canada has been fortunate in that the salmon
have given her enough time, but they cannot do so indefinitely.
Direct bilateral negotiations with Denmark have been similarly
fruitless. The problem here, as within ICNAF, is that the element of
compulsion is missing. It has been suggested from some quarters
that Canada should "get tough" by placing economic sanctions
against Denmark. 7 5 The Americans tried this approach and on the
surface it appeared to bring results. However, upon more careful
analysis it has been shown that other more significant factors were
impinging upon the situation to precipitate limited acquiescence on
the part of Denmark. 76 Most countries, and neither Denmark nor
Canada are exceptions to the rule, will follow a given course of
conduct provided it remains to their advantage to do so, and they
will desist from this course only when a greater disadvantage
weighs against continuance in that direction. Even if Canada should
reach an agreement with Denmark it would provide no permanent
protection for her Atlantic salmon fishery in the absence of further
recognition of exclusive managerial authority of the state of origin.
A durable solution requires a more comprehensive obligation that
would bind Denmark - and any other country who exhibits an
inclination to fish for Atlantic salmon on the high seas - over and
above a transitory agreement not to fish for salmon while the right to
fish them is still retained.
The current Law of the Sea negotiations, in that they contain the
potential for establishing a new world order for ocean management,
furnish a fertile ground for Canada to resolve the issue of the
Atlantic salmon in her favour. It was early recognized that "the
thing has to be decided in the international forum of the United
Nations, at the Law of the Sea Conference. It has to be established,
as an international principle, that the country of origin has a special
interest in those salmon. We cannot depend on countries just going
74. Standing Committee on Ext. Aff., No. 23, (May 4, 1971), at 24-25; E. L.
Harrison, President of the Fisheries Council of Canada referring to a brief before
the Committee
75. Standing Committee on Fisheries,No. 7, (May 4, 1972), at 18. The comments
of Mr. McGrath are illustrative: "If we were able to put the same force behind our
arguments as the Americans, we might get somewhere with the Danes. I think the
only tool we have, quite frankly, is the economic one." Cf. note 47 supra
76. Supra,'pp. 17-18, 19 in reference to the Danish-American treaty on salmon
quotas, 23 U.S.T. 1278 (1972)
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along with the idea because they like Canada. It must be established
as a principle. ' 7 7 No greater opportunity will arise where Canada
will be able to obtain recognition of the principle requisite to her
claim.
Canada has been pressing with diligence on the question of
anadromous species in the relevant fori of the Law of the Sea
Conference. During the preparatory stages for the conference
Canada made a joint submission together with India, Kenya and Sri
Lanka of a draft article on anadromous species in line with her own
declared position on the issue. 78 Denmark submitted a draft article
of its own on the subject - in essence a rebuttal of the Canadian
contention:
The exploitation of anadromous species shall be regulated by
agreement among interested States or by international arrangements through the appropriate intergovernmental fisheries
organization.
All interested States shall have an equal right to participate in
such arrangements and organizations. Any arrangement shall
take into account the interests79of the State of origin and the
interests of other coastal States.
The Danish proposal, while making a small concession to "States
of origin," sought in its terms to constrain a country like Canada
within the same sort of frustrating circumstances that confronted her
in ICNAF.
Canada again attempted to clarify and advance the substance of
her claim in a working paper entitled The Special Case of Salmon the most important anadromous species.8 0 The language was
diplomatic, the thrust of the argument familiar: "A regime must be
found which assures for the State of origin the fruits of its efforts
and so encourages it to continue to bear the costs. This requires
curtailment of the fishing of salmon in the open sea outside national
jurisdiction and co-operation with the State of origin by other States
through whose zones the salmon may migrate." In the spring of
1975 the Minister of External Affairs, Allan MacEachen pointed to
a "clear trend towards a three-tier concept" in the Law of the Sea
negotiations. He referred first to the drive for an economic zone out
77. Standing Committee on Ext. Aff., No. 1, (March 12, 1974), at 27
78. See Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A.O.R., 28th Sess.,
Supp. No. 21 Vol. III, U.N. Doc. A/9021, at 82 (1973)
79. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.37, (5 August 1974)
80. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.81, (23 August 1974)
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to 200 miles, then to the idea of the seabed beyond these zones
being reserved under international supervision for the common
heritage of mankind and last to "the application throughout the
oceanic space of sound management principles for the use and
preservation of the sea. ' 8 1 Assuming these trends have been
accurately identified, the issue of anadromous species fits neatly
within the third trend delineated where "sound management
principles" are considered to be synonomous with the exercise of
authority of the State of origin. Perhaps the goal is an attainable one
since voices outside Canada have acknowledged the possibility of
such a consensus emerging: "For coastal and anadromous species,
which have special natural relationships to the territory of the
coastal state, some arrangement by which the flag follows the fish
even when they wander beyond the limits of the coastal resource
zone may well be worked out.' '82
When the Chairman of the Second Committee of the Conference
produced a single negotiating text embracing all the matters being
dealt with in his Committee, 8 3 the inclusion of a draft article on
anadromous species constituted a significant breakthrough for
Canada. "The text clearly recognizes the primary interest and
responsibility of the State of origin in the anadromous stocks,"
remarked the Minister of External Affairs, Mr. MacEachen. "This I
think, is a very important development because we had been
fighting, so to speak, an uphill battle .... , 84 In the spring of 1975
the Second Committee re-evaluated the text article by article and a
85
revised single negotiating text was prepared.
Article 55 of the revised single negotiating text of the Second
Committee, 8 6 if accepted by the Law of the Sea Conference when
and if a consensus is reached; will give Canada at least partial
8 1. Canada, External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 25/8 at 5-6, text of
address to Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, March
11, 1975.
82. John L. Hargrove, ed., Who Protects the Ocean (St. Paul: West Publishing
and the American Society of International Law, 1975) at 200
83. The Conference had decided in plenary session at its 55th meeting on 18 April
1975 that each chairman of the three major committees would prepare a single
negotiating text of all relevant subjects to serve as the basis for further discussion
and ultimate agreement of the parties. See United Nations Conference on the Law

of the Sea, O.R., Vol. IV, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975)
84. Canada, External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 75/18; address to
Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, May 22, 1975
85. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 8/REV. I/PARTII, (1976)
86. For the text of the article see Appendix II
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recognition of her preferential interests in the Atlantic salmon.
Paragraph 1 recognizes that "States in whose rivers anadromous
stocks originate shall have the primary interest in and responsibility
for such stocks." Paragraph 2 after pointing to the onus on the State
of origin to ensure the proper conservation of stocks, permits that
state to "after consultation with other States fishing these stocks,
establish total allowable catches for stocks originating in its rivers."
Paragraph 3 prohibits the exploitation of anadromous species on the
high seas except where "this provision would result in economic
dislocation for a State other than the State of origin," and provides
further that the "State of origin shall co-operate in minimizing
economic dislocation in such other States fishing these stocks
... . "However, this introduction of an element of equity in the
system does not remove the primary authority of the State of origin
to manage the stocks since paragraph 3(e) further provides that the
State of origin should give "special consideration" to those states
contributing in some tangible fashion to the preservation and
renewal of the species involved. Furthermore, clause (d) of
paragraph 3 stipulates that those states, other than the State of
origin, into whose waters of national jurisdiction the salmon migrate
"shall co-operate with the State of origin with regard to the
conservation and management of such stocks." This clause
compells a State in Denmark's position to come to terms with the
management authority of the State of origin, the result being a better
world for countries like Canada though not the best of all possible
worlds which exclusivity of exploitation would provide.
A widely held objective in the Law of the Sea Conference is to
hold out for what is becoming known as the "package deal" as
represented by the entirety of the revised single negotiating text. 87 If
indeed the Law of the Sea Conference resolves down to an all or
nothing situation, the passage of Article 55 of Part II of the text is by
no means assured. This is not to say that a piecemeal approach to
the negotiating text would be preferable, but the fact remains that
the passage of the article cannot be relied upon by Canada.
Canada's recent declaration of a 200 mile fisheries zone8 8 in
anticipation of the adoption of Article 45 of Part II of the text 8 9 or, it
might be said, regardless of whether the article is adopted or not,
87. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/REV.I/PARTS I-II (6 May, 1976)
88. Canada, External Affairs, Communique No. 116, November 2, 1976, supra,
note 71
89. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/REV.I/PART 11 (1976), Article 45, Breadth of
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exemplifies the sentiments of many countries to the effect that they
cannot wait forever. The Minister of External Affairs enunciated the
Canadian attitude to continued stalemate in unambiguous language
before the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly:
No government is more committed than my own to achieving
agreement on a viable and balanced global regime for the seas.
But I should be less than candid if I did not state clearly that the
Canadian Government, like many other governments, cannot be
expected to wait indefinitely for agreement ....
Only if the multilateral approach fails - and at a certain point
further delay or procrastination is failure - will my Government,
and I assume others, resort to other solutions to protect
fundamental national interests. 90
Economic zones are one thing, the special problem of anadromous
species another. The latter, unfortunately, does not lend itself to
resolution through unilateral means.
The fact that Canada has advocated the inclusion of "a
comprehensive system of compulsory dispute settlement in the Law
of the Sea Convention" 9 1 constitutes explicit recognition of the
limitations inherent in both unilateralism and voluntarism (dispute
resolution by mutual agreement) in the settlement of conflict.
Dispute settlement mechanisms would be especially advantageous
where a relevant legal rule exists to be applied by a third party. If
Article 55 can be placed within the context of such a rule then the
case for more comprehensive protection and preferential exploitation of anadromous species becomes much stronger. What is sought
in the present instance is to introduce an element of potentially
decisive weight into consideration aside from elusive agreements
between parties and perhaps to shift the balance in favour of one
adversary. A codification of the abstention principle as it would
apply to anadromous species could give Canada the security sought
for her beleagured salmon runs, not to mention the people whose
livelihood and prosperity attaches thereto.
V. JustificationIn Law
The following argument proposes that the abstention principle is
the exchsive economic zone: The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured.
90. Canada, External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 75/29, speech by
Allan MacEachen, September 22, 1975
91. Canada, External Affairs, Statement, address by the Minister of External
Affairs, Allan MacEachen, to the Third Law of the Sea Conference, April 12, 1976.
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eligible for consideration as a rule in customary international law. A
claim for the existence of such a rule imposes a two-fold
requirement on the party seeking to make it: first, the presence of
sufficient state practice in support of the rule taking into account its
duration, scope and consistency; 92 and second, the presence of
opinio iuris being the "general recognition among States of a
certain practice as obligatory." 9 3 Article 38, paragraph 1 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice describes international
custom "as evidence of a general practice accepted as law," thus
embracing these two essential elements. Proof of a sense of
obligation is the most crucial element to be established. "The sense
of legal obligation, as opposed to motives of courtesy, fairness, or
morality, is real enough," declares one perceptive scholar, "and
the practice of states recognizes a distinction between obligation and
usage. The essential problem is surely one of proof, and especially
the incidence of the burden of the proof." 94 Both the International
Court and the Permanent Court before it have been strict in
95
requiring that this burden of proof be satisfied.
Meeting this onus will remove a number of fundamental
stumbling blocks to universal recognition of the abstention principle
respecting anadromous species. A. W. Koers, in his study of
international fisheries agreements, has pointed out that a state can
only control its fisheries within zones of national jurisdiction. "As
far as all other areas of the sea are concerned, the only way to bring
about regulation of fishing operations is by international
cooperation." 96 Moreover, Koers notes that to date no international
organization has been entrusted with the enforcement of a fisheries
agreement and that such rights have been invariably retained by the
flag state. 97 This assumption would hold in all cases if the
92. See Judge Read in the Anglo-Noriveigian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. Rep.
116 at 191. "Customary international law is the generalization of the practice of
States"; Asylum Case [1950] I.C.J. Rep..266 at 276-277; U.S. Nationals in
Morocco Case [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 176 at 200; Nottebohin Case (Second Phase)
[1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4 at 30.
93. J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed. by H. Waldock, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1963) at 61
94. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 2nd ed., (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1973) at 8
95. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3 at 43; S.S. Lotus,
P.C.I.J. Ser. A. No. 10 at 28 (1927)
96. A. W. Koers, The Enforcement of InternationalFisheriesAgreements on the
High Seas, Law of the Sea Institute, occasional paper No. 6 (Kingston: University
of Rhode Island, 1970) at 1.
97. Id. at 17-20; the recently instituted inspection procedures in ICNAF giving
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agreement itself constituted the only basis for the obligation. If,
however, a recognized obligation existed apart from the terms of the
agreement than the latter would not be the sole basis for compliance;
under such circmustances a specific treaty might be better
understood as a subspecies of a wider norm furnishing specific
terms in consideration of the equities and particular circumstances
of the individual- case. Thus, even if an agreement was only
self-enforcing for the contracting parties, the presence of a general
obligation underscoring the terms of the agreement would increase
the onus on the parties to honour their commitments.
The abstention principle, while not a particularly new concept,
remains a product of the twentieth century realization that the
economic concepts of scarcity and competition for resource
allocation were no longer foreign to the ocean regime. The
abstention principle "reverses the Grotian argument about the
impossibility of exhaustion (and therefore the unprofitability of
investment to prevent it). It argues that if investment has taken
place, and exhaustion has been prevented, the property ought to be
conceded." 98 The depletion of fur seals and halibut in the early
years of this century and the approaches adopted to deal with these
problems, gave implicit recognition to this principle.
. The Fur Seal Convention of 1911 between Great Britain
(in right
9
of Canada), Japan, Russia and the United States came about as a
result of a mutual desire to prevent the extinction of the fur seal due
to indiscriminant pelagic sealing. The seals bred in three rookeries
in the Northern Pacific, the largest being located in the Pribiloff
Islands with smaller herds concentrating in the Commander Islands
and Robben Island. The United States was to manage the Pribiloff
herd and the Commander and Robben herds were to be managed by
the Russians and Japanese respectively. A shared revenue
arrangement was worked out where each country would manage its
herd and pay a certain percentage of the proceeds to the other
contracting parties in return for complete abstention for pelagic
mutual inspection privileges to contracting members - what Koers would call a
system of "mutual reinforcement" - provide an example of a partial derogation
from the general pattern he cites. See ICNAF, 20 Proceedings1969-1970, supra,
note 66 at 20-22
98. F.T. Christy Jr. and A. Scott, The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries,
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965) at 187.
99. Treaties, Conventions, InternationalActs, Protocolsand Agreements Between
the United States and Other Powers, 1910-1923 (s. Doc. 348, 67th Cong. 4th
Sess., 1923) at 2966
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sealing by all concerned. Under this scheme the herds recovered and
0
all parties benefited through increased harvests. 10
It is interesting to note that the receipt of benefits under this treaty
was contingent upon the responsibilities assumed. Three of the
countries had rights to harvest because of their direct responsibilities
to conserve and manage the resource, while one country received
compensation for refraining from taking the seals outside
management authority. The treaty lapsed during the Second World
War; however, there was no renewal of large-scale pelagic sealing
and a new agreement was negotiated between the parties in 1957. 101
The success and longevity of these conventions gave early strength
to the fledgling concept of abstention.
The Halibut Treaty of 1923102 arose under similar circumstances
and was a bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States
with the original purpose of establishing a Commission to look into
the problem of declining catches. After the Halibut Commission had
submitted its report, a regulatory mechanism was added in 1930,
again by treaty, ' 0 3 to plan and supervise the recovery of the fishery.
As with seals, the renewal of the Pacific Halibut fishery has been
04
spectacular. 1
Both the seal and halibut conventions involved an application of
the concept of abstention on a mutual basis by the contracting
parties. Costs and responsibilities were shared as were the benefits.
However, a factor of prime significance in both of these precedents
is the absence of interference by third parties upon the respective
international arrangements. The simple explanation was the absence
of any other parties interested in the same resource; nevertheless,
both cases serve as examples of de facto observance of the
abstention principle at the international level. It would be
reasonable toassume that had any such interference occurred, there
would have been a strong element of compulsion operating upon the
100. See Jozo Tomasevich, InternationalAgreements on Conservation of Marine
Resources, reprinted 1971 (San Francisco: Stanford University Press, 1943) at
93-122; and Herrington and Kask, "International Conservation Problems, and
Solutions in Existing Conventions," in Papers Presented at the International
Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea,
Rome, April to 19 May 1955, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 10/7, 145 at 152-153 (1955)
101. Interim Convention on the Conservation of North PacificFur Seals, signed at
Washington, February 9, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 2283 (1957)
102. 43 U.S. Stat. L., 1841-1843 (1924)
103. U.S. State Dept., Treaty Series, No. 837 (1930)
104. See generally Tomasevich, supra, note 100 at 141-215; esp. at 143-145,
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offender to respect the interests of the affected treaty members.
The Fraser River Convention for the protection of sockeye
salmon, while more akin to the present topic in terms of its subject
matter, is of less persuasive value. The agreement was signed in
1930 and ratified in 1937.105 It provided for the establishment of a
commission with regulatory powers and a budget shared equally by
both countries. The salmon run had been depleted drastically due to
overfishing and the occurrence of a rockslide in 1913 blocking
upstream migration. The Commission sponsored the construction of
the world's largest fish ladder at Hell's Gate and this, together with
the regulation of fishing methods and population management, have
substantially restored the run. 10 6 The agreement which is still
operative provided for an equal division of the total catch between
Canada and the United States, a division which some Canadian
interests no longer consider equitable 10 7 in view of the fact that the
run is located entirely within Canada and the sacrifices entailed in
the preservation of the river bed are born by her alone. ' 0 8
In 1937, American fishermen in Alaska became very upset when
it was thought that Japanese fishing vessels were taking salmon off
Bristol Bay. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull made a series of
representations to Japan invoking preferential and exclusionary
rights for Alaskan salmon fishermen. ' 0 9 Despite the fact that the
Japanese were fishing on the high seas, American authorities
perceived the existence of a justifiable proprietal right possessed by
their domestic salmon fishery. The incident was indicative of a
growing concern over the west coast salmon industry as a whole.
The Truman Proclamations of 1945110 pertaining to the extension
of national jurisdiction over the continental shelf and the authority
to establish "High Seas Fishery Conservation Zones contiguous to
the coasts of the United States" were of fundamental significance in
eroding the Grotian notion of absolute freedom of the seas beyond
155-159, 209-215
105. 184L.N.T.S. 306 (1938)
106. Tomasevich, supra, note 100 at 257-265; Herrington and Kask, supra, note
100 at 156-157; Haig-Brown, supra, note 14 at 65, 71
107. See the statement by E. L. Harrison before the Standing Committee on Ext.
Aff., No. 23, (May 4, 1971) at 24
108. The reference here is to a proposed power-dam for the Fraser River, Haig
Brown,supra, note 14 at 65, 71
109. See U.S. Department of State, Press Releases, 445 (1937); ForeignRelations
of the United States, Vol. IV, at 734-779 (1937)
110. 13 Dept. of State Bulletin, 484 (1945)
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the traditional three mile limit. The second, lesser-known,
proclamation assumes importance here if only by virtue of the
practical value the White House attached to the document, not to
mention the authority which the Proclamation conferred.
As a result of the establishment of this new policy, the United
States will be able to protect effectively, for instance, its most
valuable fishery, that for the Alaska salmon. Through painstaking conservation efforts and scientific management the United
States has made excellent progress in maintaining the salmon at
high levels. However, since the salmon spends a considerable
portion of its life in the open sea, uncontrolled fishery activities
on the high seas . . . have constituted an ever present menace to
the salmon fishery. "I

The argument of the Americans in 1945 bears marked resemblance
to the more recent Canadian plea for her own salmon fisheries.
The Truman Proclamation of Fisheries spurred several LatinAmerican states -

Chile, Ecuador and Peru -

to prematurely

invoke 200 mile exclusive fisheries jurisdictions while other nations
made similar though less extensive claims. 1 2 However, its real
significance lay in giving rise to the possibility of a state unilaterally
imposing conservation measures on the resources of a portion of the
high seas, "setting the precedent," according to one analyst, "that
such acts might generate international norms, at least if their
motives (in this case conservation) were morally and scientifically
acceptable."1 3 While it was clear that some problems were not
amenable to unilateral solutions the initiative had been created for
invoking national conservation interests.
The International Convention For the High Seas Fisheries of the
North Pacific Ocean 14 followed in the wake of the new approach
delineated by Truman. Yet in many respects it employed principles
and methods already tested on the previous problems of seals and
halibut. The convention negotiated between Canada, the United
States and Japan was signed at Tokyo on 9 May 1952; it established
a comprehensive regulatory regime for the contracting parties.
Article V of the Convention in the second paragraph stated that with
111. Id., press statement, September 28, 1945
112. See Brownlie, supra, note 94 at 218, 229, 257
113. K. G. Niveihed, "Assessment of the Extension of State Jurisdiction in Terms
of the Living Resources of the Sea" in J.K. Gamble and G. Pontecorvo, eds., Law
of the Sea: The Emerging Regime of the Oceans (Cambridge: Ballinger Pub. Co.,

1973) at 21
114. 205 U.N.T.S. 65 (1955)
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respect to any stock of fish enumerated in the annex to the
Convention "The Contracting Parties . . . accordingly agree that
the appropriate party or parties shall abstain from fishing such stock
and the party or parties participating in the fishing of such stock
11 5
shall continue to carry out necessary conservation measures."
Annex l(c) of the Convention included salmon in this preferential
list of stocks whereby Japan was prohibited from the pelagic fishing
of salmon stocks east of 175 degrees west longitude, 116 a line drawn
to contain the range of all Pacific salmon of North American origin.
The treaty was originally entered into for a period of ten years, but it
remains in effect subject to annual agreement of the parties.
The relevant provisions of the North Pacific Convention
constitute explicit recognition and practical application of the
abstention principle to fisheries management. The provisions
pertain to anadromous species - the Pacific salmon - and furnish
longstanding state practice going to the special case for Atlantic
salmon which Canada has pressed against Denmark. It has been
pointed out that the treaty is in a precarious position while subject to
a yearly treadmill of negotiation and that should negotiations break
down or other countries intervene and take up pelagic fishing for
salmon the whole North American fishery would be in peril. 117 It is
instructive to note, however, that over a significant length of time
neither threat has materialized.
In Contrast to such persuasive state practice, stands the failure of
the joint submission by Canada and the United States of a draft
article containing the abstention principle for inclusion in the 1958
Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas. 118
The case for the principle of abstention had been made eloquently
enough at Rome in 1955.119 And the draft article came up for
discussion within the International Law Commission in 1956.120
The text read as follows;
Where, within reasonable limits, the maximum sustainable
115. Id. at90
116. Id. at 96
117. Crutchfield and Pontecorvo, supra, note 59 at 193
118. For text see U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.54 (1958); 52A.J.I.L. 851 (1958)
119. See W. C. Herrington, "Comments on the Principle of Abstention" in
Report of the InternationalTechnical Conference on the Conservationof the Living
Resources of the Sea, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 10/6 at 344 (1955)
120. 356 mtg., I.L.C. Yrbk., Vol. I, (1956)
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yield under current conditions of any stock of fish is already
being obtained and the maintenance and further development of
such yield is dependent on the conservation programme,
including research, development and conservation being carried
on by the State or States whose nationals are substantially fishing
such stock, States not so fishing or which have not done so within
a reasonable period of time, excepting the coastal State adjacent
to the waters in which this stock is found, shall abstain from
fishing such stock.
In commenting upon the article, Mr. Padilla Nervo noted that
"there was a difference between measures for the conservation of
resources which applied equally to nationals and foreigners, and the
sole right of exploitation of resources, which involved the exclusion
of foreign fishermen." He concluded, therefore, that while the
position was justified "the abstention principle, being clearly
discriminatory, could not be regarded as a measure of conservation," and for that reason it should be rejected from the
convention. 121
The arguments of the Commission were somewhat misplaced.
The fact that the principle of abstention provides for the allocation
of resources does not preclude it from also being a measure directed
to the conservation of those same resources. 122 Further, the article
applied to "any stock" of fish. Phrased in this fashion, the article
gave the abstention principle a much wider range of application than
is presently sought. Such a level of generality may have militated
against the adoption of the article without necessarily ruling out the
application of the principle in specialized cases.
Turning now to very recent precedents for the principle of
abstention, specifically with respect to anadromous species, Canada
has entered into four separate bilateral treaties 12 3 negotiated in
conjunction with the extension of an exclusive Canadian fisheries
zone to 200 miles 124 wherein the principle is recognized. The
wording of the relevant clauses are substantially the same in the
121. Id. at 123-124.
122. See M.S. McDougal and W. T. Burke, The Public Orderof the Oceans (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962) at 958
123. Agreement between Canada and Norway, in force May 11, 1976; agreement
between Canada and Poland, in force May 14, 1976; agreement between Canada
and the Soviet Union, in force May 19, 1976; agreement between Canada and
Spain, in force, June 10, 1976, supra note 69
124. Order-In-Council, November 1, 1976; in force, January 1, 1977, supra note
69
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agreements concluded with Poland, the Soviet Union and Spain,
Article III of the agreement concluded with the Soviet Union
providing:
1. The Government of Canada and the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics recognize that States in whose fresh
waters anadromous stocks originate have the primary interest in
and responsibility for such stocks and agree in principle that
fishing for anadromous species should not be conducted in areas
beyond the limits of national fisheries jurisdiction. They will
continue to work together for the establishment of permanent
multilateral arrangements reflecting this position, taking into
account all relevant factors.
2. Pursuant to paragraph (1), the Government of Canada and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall take
measures to ensure that their nationals and vessels avoid the
taking of anadromous stocks spawned in waters under the
jurisdiction of the other Contracting Party.
The negotiation of these agreements constitutes affirmative,
contemporary recognition of the principle of abstention from
significant representatives within the international community.
Moreover, the agreements specify a practical commitment to the
observance of the obligation.
The agreement with Norway parallels the other agreements in the
first paragraph of Article III. However, this paragraph constitutes
the entire provision of the article and the prescription for abstention
contained in the second paragraph to the articles in the Spanish,
Polish and Russian texts was not included. Nevertheless,
considering that Norway was at one time an active participant in the
West Greenland salmon fishery, the inclusion of the article even in
reduced form stands as a remarkable achievement and attests to a
growing acceptance of the Canadian position on the salmon issue.
* **

The foregoing discussion has delineated a significant body of
treaty law both bilateral and multilateral in character going to both
the recognition and application of the principle of abstention,
predominantly as this principle relates to the special case of
anadromous species. It is, of course, self-evident that a treaty in
itself is binding only upon the parties to the agreement. However, it
is here contended that the aforementioned body of treaty law may be
considered as evidence of a rule of customary international law,
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inasmuch that the rule covers the exploitation and conservation of
anadromous species and specifically salmon.
In furthering this contention, the writer adopts the rationale
originally advanced by Anthony D'Amato. 125 The primary function
of treaties is that they immediately bind the contracting parties in
law to the terms contained therein. This much is recognized.
What has not been sufficiently recognized in the literature of
international law is a secondary, yet significant, effect of treaties.
Not only do they carve out law for the immediate parties, but they
also have a profound impact upon general customary law for
nonparties. For a treaty arguably is a clear record of a binding
international commitment that constitutes the "practice of
states" and hence is as much a record of customary behavior as
any other state act or restraint. International tribunals have clearly
recognized this effect of treaties upon customary law, and
historically treaties have a decisive impact upon the content of
international law.
The argument follows that "generalizable provisions in bilateral
and multilateral treaties generate customary rules of law binding
upon all states."' 21 6 It is important to note that the provision must
indeed have general application in order to be generative of
customary international law. Specific military or economic aid
agreements between countries do not contain this characteristic, nor
would for example, the terms of an agreement relating to the
navigation of a particular river. 127
If, however, the general applicability of the provision can be
established, then it has the potential for giving rise to a rule of
customary law binding upon all states. "The claim made here,"
again quoting Prof. D'Amato, "is not that treaties bind nonparties,
but that generalizable provisions in treaties give rise to rules of
28
customary law. . .The custom is binding, not the treaty." 1
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as Prof.
D'Amato indicates, 129 expressly recognizes the dual function of
treaties as contracts establishing law between the parties and as
125. D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1971) 104-166; also see R. R. Baxter, "Multilateral Treaties as
Evidence of Customary International Law" (1965-1966), 41 B.Y.I.L. 275
126. Id. at 104
127. See European Commission of the Danube, Advisory Opinion P.C.I.J. Ser. B,
No. 14, (1927).
128. D'Amato, supra, note 125 at p. 107
129. Id. at 107
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sources of customary international law Articles 34 to 37 of the
Convention deal with the operative effect of treaties on third states,
the general rule being stated in article 34 to the effect that "A treaty
does not create either obligations or rights for a third state without
its consent." But, immediately following, Article 38 states
unequivocally that "Nothing in Articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set
forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a customary rule of
international law, recognized as such." Keeping in mind that it is
the provision which is generative of the rule and not the treaty in
itself, the two articles are entirely consonant with one another. 130
Moreover, the International Court of Justice has shown itself to
be aware of this secondary but important law-making function of
treaties. In the North Seas Continental Shelf Cases'3 1 the Court
rejected Denmark's claim that Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf, 132 prescribing the equidistance principle as a criterion for the delimitation of jurisdictional
boundaries between nations was binding as a rule of law upon the
Federal Republic of Germany which had not ratified the convention.
Denmark had argued first that Article 6 was merely a codification of
a pre-existing customary rule of international law. The Court could
find no uniform state practice to this effect and dismissed the
33
contention. 1
Denmark then attempted to assert that even if Article 6 did not
point to pre-existing customary international law the article itself
gave rise to a norm binding Germany. The Court observed the basis
of the contention and remarked:
• . . it clearly involves treating that article as a norm-creating
provision which has constituted the foundation of, or has
generated a rule which, while only conventional or contractual in
its origin, has since passed into the general corpus of
international law and is now accepted as such by the opinio iuris,
so as to have become binding even for countries which have
never, and do not, become parties to the Convention. There is no
doubt that this process is a perfectly possible one and does from
time to time occur: it constitutes indeed one of the recognized
methods by which new rules of customary international law may
be formed. At the same time this
result is not lightly to be
34
regarded as having been obtained. 1
130.
131.
132.
133.

For text see 63 A.J.I.L. 875, 886-887 (1969)
[1969]I.C.J. Rep. 3
For text see 52A.J.I.L. 851 at 853 (1958)
[1969]I.C.J. Rep. 3 at 38-39

134. [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3 at 41
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Having recognized the validity of the approach, the Court again
rejected the Danish position since Article 6 was subject to the
35
general reservation clause in Article 12 of the convention'
permitting any signatory to excise it from the whole thereby
negating the general applicability of the provision. Only Articles 1
to 3 were immune from this reservation clause giving them the
general force of application that Article 6 lacked. Therefore, the
Court concluded, "it is the Convention itself which would . . .
seem to deny to the provisions of Article 16 the same norm-creating
136
character as, for instance, Articles 1 and 2 possess."
The decision of the World Court clearly confirms the norm
generative function of treaties. Moreover, it will be shown, there is
sufficient practice across a sufficiently broad spectrum for the claim
being made with respect to the present problem at issue. It should
also be pointed out that previous to its direct consideration of the
norm-generative function of treaties in the North Seas Continental
Shelf Cases, the International Court has applied treaties by
themselves as indicative of customary international law binding
37
upon non-signatories. 1
The present contention applies pre-eminently to situations where
principles of international law and the practice of states have not
spoken to the matter such that there is a pre-existing rule. The 1967
Convention on Outer Space serves as a case on point.13 8 Where,
however, norm-creating provisions of treaties are of sufficient
specificity they may qualify an existing principle of international
law without necessarily coming into direct conflict with it. Thus, it
may be asserted that the abstention principle in the context of the
special problem of anadromous species could stand alongside the
wider principle of freedom to fish on the high seas codified in the
1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas. 139 So viewed the seemingly contrary
135. 52A.J.I.L. 851 at 858 (1958)

136. [1969]I.C.J. Rep. 3 at 4 3

137. Nottebohin Case (Second Phase), [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 21-23
138. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies; for text see 61
A.J.I.L 644 (1967)
139. 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (1966), Article l.(i): "All states have the right for their
nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject (a) to their treaty
obligations, (b) to the interests and rights of coastal states as provided for in this
convention, and (c) to the provisions contained in the following articles concerning
conservation of the living resources of the high seas." Note that paragraph (c) is
explicit acknowledgement that such exceptions are possible.
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notions expressed in these principles need not be regarded as
mutually exclusive of one another.
The state practice presented in support of the abstention principle
as applied to anadromous species points to the recent establishment
of a customary rule of international law prohibiting the free
exploitation of these fish. The recent series of bilateral treaties
negotiated by Canada with Norway, Poland, the Sovient Union and
Spain 140 should be regarded as determinative of the present
existence of the rule. When combined with the long standing North
Pacific Fisheries Convention' 4 ' and the genesis of state practice
preceding it, these treaties form a comprehensive testimonial to the
binding nature of the principle. This is true for a number of reasons.
First, it will be recognized that in view of Canadian interests and the
subject matter of the North Pacific Convention these treaty
provisions pertain in particular to the control and conservation of
salmon fisheries.
Second, it is important to note that only a few countries in the
world are either producers of salmon in significant quantities or fish
for salmon on a large scale. Canada, the United States and the
Soviet Union are the chief producers while the countries of Western
Europe -

individually at least -

are secondary contributors. The

major producers are also the major fishermen. Apart from the West
Greenland salmon fishery, Japan is the only other country which
engages in a large commercial salmon fishery and this fishery is
regulated in accordance with the abstention principle. Thus, all the
countries of the world with important salmon interests - even
Norway, a former supporter of Denmark's position - have
recognized the abstention principle and are putting it into operation,
if they have not done so already.
The fact that a decisive majority of the world salmon fishing
fraternity have bound themselves to the abstention principle is
persuasive evidence of customary rule of international law. While
the club is small it is sufficient to generate the norm in a view of the
limited number of parties directly affected.
At this point it is essential to recognize that the case being made
goes 'to general customary international law. It might be contended
that, considering the limited number of interests affected, even if a
norm does exist it is constitutive only of special (local) customary
140. Supra, notes 122, 69
141. Supra, note 113
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international law which operates solely on the basis of the free
consent of all parties involved. 14 2 If this argument provided a
correct view, then a country such as Denmark, in the absence of free
consent, would not be bound.
Such a view, it is submitted, does not apply to the customary rule
presently advocated. Special custom is by definition locally
delimited and has relevance only by virtue of its local context. In
contrast, the norm delineated is generalizable to the extent that it is
applicable to any member of the international community who
chooses to fish for anadromous species. Indeed, the abstention
principle has no value unless so generalized. Salmon range over all
the oceans of the northern hemisphere. The problem in its very
nature and extent speaks to the necessity of a general rule.
VI. Conclusions
The chronicle of the dispute between Canada and Denmark over the
Atlantic salmon reveals one country seeking to protect an
investment which had long been taken for granted. Then, when the
prospect of losing all the capital suddenly rendered it vital, causing
the party even to forego dividends for awhile, the question of
entitlement to those dividends - no longer as generous as before became an important issue. The other country had briefly and
copiously enjoyed the dividends from surplus capital the investor
had never missed. But when the surplus was exhausted what had
also been taken for granted as a natural right of access became
bitterly contested.
142. The requirement of consent is recognized as being obligatory in cases of
special arrangements between states giving rise to a customary practice. This
element is introduced primarily because the custom has no relevance for third
parties; the specialized nature of the custom such as Portugal's contended right of
passage through the territory of India has no generalizable application to any other
state. Right of Passage Case [1960] I.C.J. Rep. 4 at 39-44. Therefore the fact of
consent is the primary determinant of the existence of the custom. For further
recognition of the distinction between special and general custom and the
requirement of consent see European Commission of the Danube, Advisory
Opinion (1927), P.C.I.J. Ser. B, No. 14, 4 at 17; Free City of Danzig, Advisory
Opinion, P.C.I.J. Serv. B, No. 18, 6 at 12-13 (1930);Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J.
Rep. 266 at 277; U.S. Nationals in Morocco, [19521 I.C.J. Rep. 176 at 199-200.
See generally D'Amato, "The Concept of Special Custom in International Law"
(1969), 63 A.J.I.L. 211 D'Amato, supra, note 125 at 233-263; H.W.A. Thirlway,
International Customary Law and Codification (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1972) at
59-60, 134-9; M.S. McDougal et al., Studies in World Public Order (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1960) at 15.
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The Canadian claim for exclusive exploitation of Atlantic salmon
coming from Canada's rivers by virtue of her status as a State of
origin is congruent with valid principles of conservation and
economic efficiency. Moreover it is a reasonable claim. A shrinking
global environment and a growing propensity for making political
decisions on the misguided and destructive assumption that "if we
do not somebody else will," should be cause enough to provide
incentives for intelligent conservation. It is noteworthy that despite
external frustrations Canada has pressed forward to protect the
Atlantic salmon even though there exists no firm guarantee of being
rewarded for her efforts. On any sort of cost-benefit analysis
establishing an entitlement to reap the benefits of delivering the
Atlantic salmon from near extinction, Canada certainly merits a
preferred position.
Attempts at utilizing alleged legal norms from any position other
than a retrospective and comfortable hindsight are necessarily
artificial and prone to abstraction. The previous foray in support of
the abstention principle certainly falls within this nebulous category
of the marginal and tenuous; nevertheless, theoretical make-weights
may serve to illuminate issues whether or not they are ultimately
successful in substantiating a given argument. Unfortunately,
however, even if it should not prove overly presumptuous to
attribute legal validity to the principle of abstention in relation to
anadromous species, the problem of obeisance remains; enforcement that would be effective cannot seriously be contemplated.
It is hardly likely that Canada will enjoy the right of sole access to
her own salmon. The Canadian claim suffers further prejudice in
that the notions of exclusivity and equity are generally regarded as
incompatible, even though the unique problem of the salmon would
appear to render exclusive rights also equitable. But, predictably,
the nature of diplomatic negotiations demands compromise. It can
only be hoped that for the sake of the Atlantic salmon and all they
mean to Canada, the best solution obtainable will prove to be good
enough.

Fisheries Jurisdiction the Atlantic Salmon: 645

APPENDIX I
Table I
Catch quantities and landed value for Atlantic Coast Salmon (1964-1974).
Year
Quantity '000 lb. (liv) Landed Value $'000
1964
4533
2,073
1965
4623
2,221
1966
5163
2,536
1967
6290
3,087
1868
4634
2,330
1969
4291
2,285
1970
4611
2,727
1971
4035
2,250
1972
3355
2,130
1973
4796
3,471
1974
4883
3,657
Source: Canada, Fisheries Statistics of Canada, Summary Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, p. 10, March 1968; p. 10, October 1969; p.
11,, November 1971; p. 10, June 1973; p. 10, May 1974; p. 12,
July 1976.
Table II
Catch quantities and landed value for salmon in the Province of New
Brunswick (1963-1974)
Year
Quantity '000 lb. (liv) Landed Value $'000
1963
640
379
1964
1038
633
1965
1196
643
1966
1214
705
1967
1436
856
1968
797
508
1969
583
421
1970
572
508
1971
266
246
1972
22
22
1973
20
26
1974
6
13
Source: Canada, Fisheries Statistics of New Brunswick, Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, Summary, p. 6, May 1969; p. 10, November
1971; p. 11, March 1973; p. 11, December 1974; p. 11, July
1976.
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APPENDIX II
Revised Single Negotiating Text for the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP 8/REV. I/PART II.
Article 55
Anadromous Stocks
1. States in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the
primary interest in the responsibility for such stocks.
2. The State of origin of anadromous stocks shall ensure conservation by
the establishment of appropriate regulatory measures for fishing in all
waters landwards of the outer limits of its exclusive economic zone
and for fishing provided for in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 3. The
State of origin may, after consultation with other States fishing these
stocks, establish total allowable catches for stocks originating in its
rivers.
3. (a) Fisheries for anadromous stocks shall be conducted only in the
waters landwards of the outer limits of exclusive economic zones,
except in cases where this provision would result in economic
dislocation for a State other than the State of origin.
(b) The State of origin shall co-operate in minimizing economic
dislocation in such other States fishing those stocks, taking into
account the normal catch and the mode of operations of such States,
and all the areas in which such fishing has occurred.
(c) States referred to in subparagraph (b), participating by agreement
with the State of origin in measures to renew anadromous stocks,
particularly by expenditures for that purpose, shall be given special
consideration by the State of origin in the harvesting of stocks
originating in its rivers.
(d) Enforcement of regulations regarding anadromous stocks beyond
the exclusive economic zone shall be by agreement between the State
of origin and the other States concerned.
4. In cases where anadromous stocks migrate into or through the waters
landwards of the outer limits of the exclusive economic zone of a State
other than the State of origin, such State shall co-operate with the State
of origin with regard to the conservation and management of such
stocks.
5. The State of origin of anadromous stocks and other States fishing these
stocks shall make arrangements for the implementation of the
provisions of this article, where appropriate, through regional
organizations.

